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UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO SELL OR LICENSE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
ANTITRUST DUTY TO DEAL
Marina Lao t
INTRODUCTION
Much has changed in the last twenty years in the antitrust approach
to intellectual property.' Prior to the 1980s, the predominant view of the
antitrust and intellectual property laws was that they conflict because the
former protects competition while the latter permits monopoly.2 Courts
and academics alike considered intellectual property rights as exceptions
to the antitrust law that must be narrowly construed.3 The notion that the
two bodies of law are diametrically opposed has since given way to the
perspective that they are complementary, not conflicting, because they
share the common goal of promoting innovation and maximizing con-
sumer welfare. 4 However, despite efforts to downplay tensions between
t Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. E-mail: laomarin@shu.edu.
I would like to thank the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy for inviting me to partici-
pate in this symposium, and the participants of the symposium for their insights. My thanks
also go to Ahmed Bulbulia, Michael Risinger, Charles Sullivan, and Alfred Yen for their
thoughts and comments; to Christina Donahue for her excellent research assistance; to Maja
Basioli for her library assistance and for her invaluable help with interet searches; and to
participants at the faculty colloquium at Albany Law School where I first outlined some of the
ideas presented in this paper.
1 For discussion of the changing trend in this area, see James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the
Gauntlet: Antitrust Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64 AIn-
TRUST L.J. 341,342-50 (1996); Norman E. Rosen, Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Pen-
dulum, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (1994); Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and
Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167 (1997).
2 See Simpson v. United Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) ("The patent laws which give a
17-year monopoly on 'making, using or selling the invention' are in pari materia with the
antitrust laws and modify them pro tanto." (citing United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S.
476, 485 (1926))); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646-47 (9th Cir.
1981) ('There is an obvious tension between the patent laws and antitrust laws. One body of
law creates and protects monopoly power while the other seeks to proscribe it.").
3 See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
176-77 (1965); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 300-04 (1948); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 140-41 (1948); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280
(1942); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). See also Tom & Newberg,
supra note 1, at 170-72, 175-83 (discussing cases in the "No-No" era (pre-1980's) and the
"No-No" policy, see infra note 99, which exemplified the view that antitrust and intellectual
property laws existed in "separate spheres").
4 See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1990) ("[Tihe aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance,
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the two bodies of law, conflicts persist and are more deep-seated than is
generally acknowledged. For example, conflict arises when a monopo-
list 5 unilaterally refuses to sell or license a patent or copyright,6 espe-
cially when the refusal to deal is intended to exclude competition in
adjacent, or complementary, markets.
Part I of this paper discusses the antitrust rule on unilateral refusals
to deal in general cases, where no intellectual property interests are at
issue. It notes that, while the statutory protections of patent and copy-
right laws necessarily affect that general rule, the extent of the effect is
unclear from the statutes themselves. Part II assesses the legal scope of
patent and copyright grants through an examination of recent case law.
While the Supreme Court has never expressly defined a patent grant, it
has said the grant does have limits beyond which there is no antitrust
immunity. Part III analyzes a provision in the Patent Interference and
Misuse Reform Act of 1988 ("Patent Reform Act")7 relating to refusals
to deal in patent cases. The provision states that refusals to license a
patent will not be considered patent misuse in a patent infringement case.
This paper discusses why the provision has no application to antitrust
cases and does not bar refusals to license a patent from serving as a basis
for antitrust claims. Finally, because neither statutory nor case law is
clear on the issue, part IV looks to policy considerations to see if antitrust
law should limit a patentee's right of refusal to deal. This part questions
a common assumption often made about the application of antitrust prin-
ciples to intellectual property rights, namely, that it would reduce innova-
tion and subvert the purposes of the intellectual property system. It also
contends that competition itself plays an important role in fostering inno-
wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are
aimed at encouraging innovation, industry, and competition."); DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guide-
lines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 1 (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 20,733 at 13,132, § 1 (April 11, 1995) [hereinafter IP Guidelines] ("The intellectual
property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation and
enhancing consumer welfare."). The change in perspective was greatly influenced by the work
of Professor Ward Bowman and other scholars. See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT & ANTI.
TRUST LAW: A LEGAL & ECONOMIC APPRAISAL (1973) (hereinafter BowvMAN, PATENT & ANTI-
TRUST LAW). Bowman refutes the idea that antitrust and patent law stand in "diametric
opposition" since they share "a common central economic goal: to maximize wealth by pro-
ducing what consumers want at the lowest cost." Id. at I.
5 As used throughout this paper, "monopolist" refers to an economic monopolist, i.e., a
firm having substantial market power in a properly defined relevant market; it does not mean a
firm having simply what older cases termed a "patent monopoly," i.e., the exclusive rights
over a patent (or copyright).
6 For simplicity, unless the context indicates otherwise, I will use "patent" expansively
in this paper to include copyright. Similarly, the term "sale" or "license" will include sale,
license, lease, and all other transfers; and reference to "products" or "goods" will include
services.
7 Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674 (1988) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(4)-(5) (1988)).
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vation, and that the current approach to reconciling antitrust and intellec-
tual property laws has undervalued this role. Overall, this paper
concludes that imposing the general antitrust duty to deal on patent hold-
ers in limited circumstances-to prohibit the use of the practice to lever-
age power in the patent market into multiple markets-may actually
encourage, rather than deter, innovation.
I. UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO DEAL
A. REFUSALS TO DEAL IN GENERAL CASES
Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes monopolization or at-
tempted monopolization, whether perpetrated through unilateral or con-
certed activity. 8 Monopolization requires proof of two elements:
monopoly power and "exclusionary" conduct.9 Monopoly power, often
defined as the ability "to control prices or exclude competition," is deter-
mined based on market share in a relevant market and other factors such
as barriers to entry. 10 Exclusionary conduct refers to the use of monop-
oly power to foreclose competition or otherwise gain a competitive ad-
vantage over a competitor." Accordingly, if unilateral refusals to deal
by a dominant firm constitute exclusionary conduct, the dominant firm
may be found to have violated the antitrust law against monopolization
or attempted monopolization if it engages in that type of behavior.
Monopoly leveraging is a form of monopolization; it refers to a
company with power in a relevant market using, or leveraging, that
power to monopolize or gain an unmerited competitive advantage in an-
other related, or complementary, market.' 2 This theory is often associ-
ated with tying arrangements-a firm's use of its power in one market
8 15 U.S.C § 2 (1988) (condemning "every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States").
9 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
10 See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
11 See id.; Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. 451, 482-83
(1992) ("Kodak 1").
12 See Alaska Airlines Inc. v. United Airlines Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9"h Cir. 1991).
Whether monopoly leveraging can be an independent violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act is
somewhat controversial. Some courts take a broad view of the theory and accept the existence
of monopoly leveraging as a distinct offense, apart from traditional monopolization claims.
Under this view, unlawful monopoly leveraging occurs when a firm with power in one market
uses that power to gain a competitive advantage in a related market, without necessarily mono-
polizing or threatening to monopolize the related market. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979). Other courts reject the notion that
monopoly leveraging exists as an independent § 2 violation. Under this restrictive view, there
is no unlawful leveraging until the dominant firm's efforts in the related market give it a
monopoly or a high probability of success in monopolizing the related market. See, e.g.,
Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 206 (3d Cir. 1992). See also infra
notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
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(the tying market) to affect competition in a complementary market (the
tied market) by effectively coercing buyers of the tying product to also
buy from it the tied product, regardless of the buyer's wishes. 13
Monopoly leveraging is also linked to unilateral refusals to deal in
some situations, such as when a firm, dominant in a primary market,
refuses to sell that product (needed for competition in a complementary
market) to its competitors in the complementary market, thereby preclud-
ing competition in that market. 14 Unilateral refusals to deal, unlike tying,
do not necessarily involve coercion, but may achieve the same effect.' 5
For example, if the dominant firm in a primary market excludes competi-
tion in a complementary market by denying competitors in that market
access to its primary product, the dominant firm essentially forces buyers
of the primary product to also buy from it the complementary product
because the lack of competition in the complementary market leaves
buyers with no other choice. In effect, unilateral refusals to deal can
accomplish indirectly what tying arrangements accomplish directly,
although without coercing any buyer's choice.
Absent intellectual property issues, the law on unilateral refusals to
deal is relatively clear. Firms without market power have no antitrust
duty to deal; they have an unrestricted right to choose with whom they
do business or not do business, so long as their action is truly independ-
ent. 16 However, at least since Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Ski-
ing Corp.,17 the Supreme Court has held that firms with substantial
market power do not have such unfettered freedom. 18 In Aspen Skiing,
13 Tying arrangements may be unlawful, under either § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act if:
the alleged tying and tied products are in fact two distinct products; the defendant has suffi-
cient market power in the tying market to distort choices for the tied product; and the tie
forecloses a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the tied market. See Jefferson Parish
Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 2-3 (1984). For an "efficiency" challenge to the
leverage theory as applied to tying arrangements, see generally Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE LJ. 19 (1957) (asserting that if, as as-
sumed, a tying monopolist is already maximizing his profits on the tying sale, a tying arrange-
ment would not produce additional monopoly effect).
14 One of the most difficult issues in monopoly leveraging cases is determining what
constitutes one market. If the alleged primary and complementary markets in fact constitute
only a single integrated market, there would be no monopoly leveraging. On the discussion of
markets, see infra notes 45-49, 59-61 and accompanying text.
Is See infra notes 36-61.
16 By definition, § 1 of the Sherman Act does not prohibit unilateral conduct, since only
"contracts, combinations.., and conspiracies" in restraint of trade is condemned. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1988). See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
17 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
18 See id. at 601-03. Before Aspen Skiing Co., the case that came closest to prohibiting a
monopolist's unilateral refusal to deal was Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States. In Otter Tail
Power Co., the Court found a wholesale power supplier's refusal to either sell wholesale
power or "wheel" power to municipalities, in order to prevent municipalities from competing
in the distribution of power, violated the antitrust laws. 410 U.S. 366, 366, 368-69 (1973).
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the defendant, a ski resort operator who owned three of the four ski
mountains in Vail, Colorado, discontinued a joint marketing arrangement
with the plaintiff, its much smaller and only competitor. The action was
apparently taken to drive the plaintiff out of business and to monopolize
the ski resort business in Vail. 19 In finding for the plaintiff, the Supreme
Court said that a dominant firm's right of refusal to deal is not absolute.
Where the defendant has substantial market power, its refusal to continue
doing business with its competitor, in the absence of any legitimate busi-
ness justification, constituted exclusionary conduct and a violation of § 2
of the Sherman Act.20 But because intellectual property issues were not
involved, Aspen Skiing provides no guidance on whether and to what
extent its rule on the antitrust duty to deal would, or should, extend to
cases where those issues are raised.
B. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
GENERAL RULE ON UNiLATERAL REFUSALS TO DEAL
Because of the statutory protections of the federal patent and copy-
right laws, the antitrust law obviously cannot treat all refusals to license
intellectual property like any other refusal to deal. The Patent Act ex-
pressly confers on a patentee an exclusive right to use or otherwise ex-
ploit its patent and to exclude others from the field claimed by the
invention for a limited time.21 The Copyright Act similarly grants a
copyright owner an exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work
and otherwise exploit the work for a specified period of time.22
From the language of exclusion and exclusivity in these statutes,
one can infer a right to not license its patent, if a patentee so chooses, in
order to maintain exclusively for itself the area claimed by the invention.
In other words, the Patent Act does not compel a manufacturer of a pat-
ented widget, for example, to license its patented technology to others so
that they, too, may produce widgets, even if the manufacturer is a mo-
nopolist (because no reasonable substitutes for widgets are available).
Nor would the Copyright Act compel a software developer to allow
others to copy its copyrighted source code in order to introduce competi-
tion in the relevant software market, even if the copyright owner has
power in the relevant market and consumers would greatly benefit from
competition. Given that the federal intellectual property laws authorize
refusals to deal in the examples just described, because they are defi-
nitely within the field claimed by the invention or creation, it would be
incongruous to apply Aspen Skiing to require an antitrust duty to deal in
19 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 586.
20 See id. at 597.
21 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 154 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
22 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
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the same context. To do so would directly contravene the explicit statu-
tory protections of the federal intellectual property system.
However, the patent and copyright statutes do not articulate the
reach of the right of exclusion and exclusivity. In other words, they do
not specify the scope of a patent or copyright grant beyond which the
statutory right of exclusion would not apply. Specifically, they do not
answer the question whether a firm's refusal to license a patent may be
considered an antitrust violation if the practice does not merely bar com-
petitors from the particular area of the invention, but also excludes them
from a related antitrust market in which the firm would otherwise have
faced competition. The following part II sketches the legal parameters of
a patent grant, within which Aspen Skiing would not apply but outside of
which it should apply.
II. LEGAL SCOPE OF PATENT AND COPYRIGHT GRANTS
A. CASELAW HISTORY: PATENT AND COPYRIGHT GRANTS
HAVE LnITs
Numerous Supreme Court cases have held that the scope of a patent
or copyright is limited.23 The Court has said, for example, that the
"scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in the claims
contained in it";24 that a patent grant "is limited to the invention which it
defines";2 5 that the patentee may not "extend the monopoly of his patent
to derive a benefit not attributable to use of the patent's teachings"; 26 that
the extent of a patentee's right "is limited by the definition of his inven-
tion, as its boundaries are marked by the specifications and claims of the
patent"; 27 and that "the boundary of a patent monopoly is to be limited
by the literal scope of the patent claims. 28 While these formulations
may not tell us precisely where the lines for a patent or copyright grant
should be drawn, they leave little doubt that the Supreme Court has con-
sistently found intellectual property protections to be limited to the area
of the grant.
A long line of Supreme Court cases on the legality of tying arrange-
ments involving patents or copyrights also confirms that there are, in-
deed, boundaries to the area protected by a patent or copyright outside of
which antitrust restrictions do apply.29 It is well established that the anti-
23 See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
24 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917).
25 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944).
26 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969).
27 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940) (citing Motion Pic-
ture Patents, 243 U.S. at 510).
28 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221 (1980).
29 See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
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trust law prohibits illegal tying arrangements involving patents, to the
same extent that it prohibits ordinary tying arrangements not involving
patents.30 Thus, if a patent owner with market power in the tying market
conditions the sale of its much desired patented (tying) product on a
buyer's purchase of an unpatented (tied) product, its conduct may consti-
tute an illegal tying arrangement in violation of the antitrust laws.31 Sim-
ilarly, when a copyright owner with market power over a relevant tying
market conditions the licensing of its coveted copyright (tying product)
to a buyer's purchase of a less desirable (tied) product from the owner,
the behavior may be illegal as a tying arrangement under antitrust law. 32
If there were no limits to the scope of a patent or copyright grant, then a
patent owner should be free to set the conditions on which it would li-
cense its intellectual property and the setting of those conditions would
not constitute an antitrust violation. The fact that the Supreme Court has
held tying arrangements involving patents to be subject to antitrust re-
striction, just as any ordinary tying arrangement, indicates that the statu-
tory protections of the patent and copyright laws are not plenary, but are
indeed limited to the area of the grant.
The Supreme Court, however, has never directly considered the le-
gality of unilateral refusals to license a patent where the practice is used
for monopoly leveraging purposes, i.e., where a monopolist denies ac-
cess to its patent to competitors in a different antitrust market in order to
reduce competition in that market.33 While the Court has said in a
number of cases that a refusal to license a patent is not unlawful since a
patentee is doing no more than exercise its lawful rights, all of the cases
in which the Court has made this pronouncement have involved pure
exclusion34-i.e., a simple denial of a license by a patentee so as to
maintain the area of the invention exclusively for itself. In none of the
cases was the practice used for monopoly leveraging.
392 (1947); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture Pat-
ents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
30 It should be noted, however, that some commentators have criticized the antitrust law
on tying on the grounds that tying arrangements are generally not anticompetitive and, there-
fore, should not be prohibited. See infra notes 132-138 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., International Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 392; Motion Picture Patents Co., 243
U.S. at 502.
32 See, e.g., Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. at 38; Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 131.
33 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9d, Cir.
1997) ("Kodak Ir').
34 See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Ha-
zeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969); Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370,
378-79 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); Continental Paper Bag Co.
v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1908); Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform
of North America, 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d
Cir. 1981).
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In a recent case, Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
[hereinafter Kodak J],35 the Court did discuss the issue. However,
although patent issues were involved in the case, the defendant had not
raised them and therefore the Court's decision was not based on an anal-
ysis of the intersection of patent and antitrust law. The following section
discusses Kodak I, as well as recent lower court decisions that have dealt
directly with the issue of unilateral refusals to deal involving patents and
copyrights.
B. RECENT CASES36
1. Kodak I
Kodak manufactured photocopiers and had a substantial share of the
market for replacement parts for the copiers. It also competed with in-
dependent service organizations ("ISOs") in the aftermarket for the ser-
vice of the copiers. To diminish the ISOs' ability to compete in the
service market, Kodak restricted their access to replacement parts, which
the ISOs needed for effective competition. The ISOs brought suit alleg-
ing that Kodak had illegally tied the purchase of its own service contracts
to parts and had used its control over the parts market to monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, the service market.37
Kodak argued on appeal that it was entitled to summary judgment.
It asserted that it could not, as a matter of law, be found to have market
power in the tying market (parts), despite its controlling market share,
because the competition it faced in the primary market for copiers pre-
cluded Kodak from raising prices in the derivative parts market.38 And,
without market power in the tying market, the argument continued, the
35 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
36 This paper will not specifically address the Antitrust Division's case against
Microsoft, as that case was the subject of the first panel at this Symposium. I will merely note
that the primary charge against Microsoft involves the tying of its Web browser (Explorer) to
its operating system (Windows), in which Microsoft is alleged to have a monopoly. The
district court recently issued its voluminous findings of fact accepting virtually every aspect of
the government's case.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 38-1232TPJ, 1999 WL 1001148 (D.D.C., Nov. 5,
1999). The court found, for example, that Microsoft possessed monopoly power in the
operating systems market, id. at *9; that consumer preferences and competitor responses
indicate that Web browsers and operating systems are separate products, id. at *41 - *42; and
that Microsoft's bundling of its Explorer browser to its Windows operating system was
undertaken not to add a desirable feature to Windows but as the key to preserving its
monopoly, id. at *36 - *38. The court's conclusions of law, which have just been issued, find
that Microsoft illegally maintained its monopoly power in the OS market through
anticompetitive means; that it attempted to monopolize the browser market; and that it illegally
bundled its browser to Windows. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp.2d 30 (2000).
In a bold move, the court ordered divestiture (and interim conduct remedies), United States v.
Microsoft, 97 F.Supp. 2d 59 (2000), but stayed all sanctions pending appeal.
37 See Kodak , 504 U.S. at 456-60.
38 See id. at 463, 465. 1
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tying claim could not stand.39 The Court rejected Kodak's assertion on
the grounds that there were insufficient facts to support its claim.40
Although many of Kodak's parts were patented, Kodak did not raise
the issue of its intellectual property rights and the Court, therefore, did
not have occasion to specifically address that issue. However, in af-
firming denial of summary judgment to Kodak, the Supreme Court noted
that a manufacturer with "inherent power" in one market is not immu-
nized from the antitrust laws in another market, and that "power gained
through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright...
can give rise to liability if 'a seller exploits his dominant position in one
market to expand his empire into the next."'41 The Court's remarks in
the now famous footnote were made in a discussion of the ISOs' tying
claim,42 not its monopolization claim 43 based on Kodak's unilateral re-
fusal to deal.44 Still, the breadth of the language leaves little doubt that
the legitimate scope of an intellectual property grant, in the Court's view,
extends only to the protected work in its relevant market but not to other
markets. The Court did not say, however, how the relevant market for
patent protection (the patent market) is to be defined, although it seemed
to assume that the tests developed for determining a relevant antitrust
market would apply.
To define a relevant antitrust market, we look to economic condi-
tions and apply the tests of elasticity of demand and supply.45 To deter-
mine the tying market in a tying claim, for example, we would see if
reasonable substitutes exist for the alleged tying product. If there are
reasonable substitutes, the relevant tying market would include not only
the tying product but also its reasonable substitutes. If the alleged tying
product is so unique or attractive that it faces no real competition, then
that product alone may form the tying market.
As to whether the tying market and an alleged tied market are truly
distinct, and not merely a single integrated market, the Court looks to
consumer demand for the two products. 46 If consumer demand is suffi-
cient for competitors to efficiently offer the two products separately, then
39 See id.
40 See id. at 477.
41 Id. at 480 n.29 (quoting Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
611 (1953)).
42 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
43 Id. § 2.
44 Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 479.
45 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956)
(stating that the relevant product market is defined by the "cross elasticity of demand between
products" and the reasonable interchangeability of the products); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
510 F.2d 894, 917 (10th Cir. 1975) (relying on the cross-elasticity of supply to determine the
relevant product market).
46 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 (1984).
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there are indeed two products and two relevant antitrust markets, despite
the fact that the products may be functionally linked.47 In the case of
Kodak, parts and services were considered to be in two distinct antitrust
markets because enough consumers wished to buy services separately
from parts that it was efficient for competitors, such as the ISOs, to offer
service independent of parts. 48
If an antitrust market legally defines the patent market as well, then
Kodak's right of exclusion under its patents for parts would be limited to
-the parts market. As such, its refusal to sell its patented parts to the
ISOs, so as to bar competition in the service market, would not be ex-
empt from antitrust scrutiny. While this position seems to be implicit in
footnote 29 in Kodak I, the Supreme Court never explicitly so held.49
2. Image Technical Services Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.
[hereinafter Kodak 11]50
After the Supreme Court in Kodak I remanded the case for trial, the
ISOs withdrew their tying claim and ultimately prevailed at trial on their
monopolization theory, which was premised on Kodak's unilateral re-
fusal to sell its patented parts to them.51 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
Kodak raised the issue of its patent rights. One of its assertions was that
a patent holder had a right not to sell or license its patents and, therefore,
Kodak's refusal to sell its patented parts to the ISOs could not be unlaw-
ful.52 In affirming a jury decision against Kodak, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected Kodak's argument and held that a monopolist's refusal to sell or
license a patent in order to exclude competition in another market may
constitute exclusionary conduct in a Sherman Act § 2 monopoly leverag-
ing claim.53 According to the court, the "basic right of exclusion [be-
stowed by a patent] does have limits" and it does not "protect an attempt
to extend a lawful monopoly beyond the grant of a patent. '54 Although
the holding was qualified to the extent that a patentee's desire to protect
its intellectual property was deemed a presumptively valid business justi-
47 See id.; Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 462.
48 See Kodak 1, 504 U.S at 462.
49 See id. at 480 n.29 (stating that the patent law provides no antitrust immunity if a
patent holder exploits "his dominant position in one market" gained from a patent or copyright
to "expand his empire into the next").
50 125 F.3d 1195 (9 t' Cir. 1997).
51 See id. at 1201. The opinion does not reveal the reason for the plaintiff's withdrawal
of its § I tying claim under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, although it is likely that there was
insufficient evidence of Kodak's conditioning the sale of parts to the end-users' purchase of
Kodak services-end-users were free to purchase parts from Kodak for self-service.
52 See id. at 1212.
53 See id. at 1217.
54 Id. at 1216.
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fication,55 the Ninth Circuit said that the presumption may be rebutted56
and was rebutted in the case by evidence of pretext.57 The Ninth Circuit
decision relied heavily on the Supreme Court's footnote 29 in Kodak I
which said that a manufacturer's possession of "inherent power" in a
market, derived from a patent, does not immunize that manufacturer
from the antitrust laws in another market.58
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the issue of liability in Kodak II
depended greatly "on the definition of the patent grant and the relevant
market. ' 59 Parts and service were proven to be separate antitrust markets
in the case.60 If the patent market coincides with the antitrust market for
parts, then Kodak's refusal to deal in order to control the service antitrust
market would fall outside the scope of the patent grant and would be
unprotected. However, if the patent market includes not only the parts
market but also the service market, then Kodak's conduct would be
within the scope of protection afforded by its patents. The Ninth Circuit
found that patent (or copyright) law, not antitrust, determines the patent
(or copyright) grant, and thus the fact that parts and services were proven
to be separate antitrust markets did not help define the extent of the pat-
ent grant. 61 But having said this, the opinion is unclear as to how the
Ninth Circuit ultimately defined the patent grant. However, since it
found that the unilateral refusal to deal in question exceeded the scope of
that grant, the Ninth Circuit clearly had to have found that parts and
service were in two separate markets, not only for antitrust purposes, but
also for patent purposes. And, the result of the case was the same as if
the antitrust market definition had been applied to define the patent
market.
3. In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation
(hereinafter Xerox)62
In Xerox, a case strikingly similar to Kodak I and II, a district court
in the Tenth Circuit expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's
55 See id. at 1218 ("'[W]hile exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's unilateral
refusal to license a [patent or] copyright,' or to sell its patented or copyrighted work, a monop-
olist's 'desire to exclude others from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid business
justification for any immediate harm to consumers."' (citing Data General v. Grumman Sys.
Support, 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1t Cir. 1994))).
56 See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1219 ("Nonetheless, this presumption is rebuttable.").
57 Id. (stating that Kodak's willingness to permit self-service undercut its quality control
claim and was evidence of pretext, thereby rebutting the presumption of valid business
justification).
58 See id. at 1215-16.
59 Id. at 1216.
60 See id. at 1217.
61 See id. at 1216-17.
62 989 F. Supp. 1131 (D. Kan. 1997).
1999]
204 CORNELL JOuRNAL OF LAW AND PuBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9:193
holding in Kodak 11.63 The case involved Xerox's refusal to sell its pat-
ented parts to its competitors in the service market, in order to preclude
competition in that market.64 The competitors, also known as ISOs, con-
tended that Xerox's refusal to deal constituted unlawful leveraging of
Xerox's undisputed monopoly power in the parts market into the service
market. 65 In rejecting that argument, the court held that Xerox's actions
did not constitute monopoly leveraging because refusing to license a pat-
ent is a right inherent under the patent grant, which is not limited to a
particular antitrust market. 66 In other words, according to the Xerox
court, a patentee's right to exclude others from its invention is absolute
and is not confined to the antitrust market covering the patented product,
in this case, parts. 67 The court noted that the "rationale of the patent
system" mandated such a conclusion.68
The courts in Kodak H and Xerox reached opposite conclusions, on
very similar facts, primarily because of their different views on the extent
of a patent grant. The Ninth Circuit essentially treated the patent grant,
or the patent market, as defined by the parts market, which constitutes a
distinct antitrust market. The district court in Xerox, however, consid-
ered the patent market to be limitless and not confined to a specific anti-
trust market. 69 Under the Xerox approach, when a patent owner excludes
competition and acquires monopolies in multiple antitrust markets by re-
fusing to license its patents, it is not engaging in unlawful monopoly
leveraging but is merely exercising its rights under the Patent Act.70
Xerox's preclusion of competition in a different antitrust market (e.g.,
service) would simply be attributable to its absolute and inherent rights
of exclusion flowing from the patents, and not to any unlawful monopoly
leveraging behavior.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 1135-38.
67 See id. at 1136. ("We believe that a patent holder can lawfully acquire more than one
"inherent" or "economic" monopoly by exercising the exclusionary power of a single
patent.").
68 Id. at 1138. The court also based its decision on the Patent Interference and Misuse
Reform Act of 1988 ("Patent Reform Act") that amended the patent laws. Pub. L. No. 100-
703, 102 Stat. 4674 (1988) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (1988). The Act
included a provision expressly stating that unilateral refusals to license or use a patent shall not
be considered patent misuse and asserted as a defense in a patent infringement case. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(4) (1988). See discussion infra part mII.
69 See Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1138 (stating that "the patent holder's reward, his exclusive
right to practice an invention, is unlimited by the law; the only limits on the patent holder's
exercise of its right are created by the demand for the product which embodies the
invention.").
70 See id. at 1135-39.
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The Xerox court's definition of a patent market seems overly broad,
and it also directly contradicts the Supreme Court's statement in Kodak L
that a manufacturer's monopoly, even if it is derived from a patent, does
not "immunize [the manufacturer] from the antitrust laws in another mar-
ket."71 While the Supreme Court's statement does not explicitly define
the market for patent purposes or expressly adopt the antitrust test, it
shows, at the very least, that the Court considers a patent market to be
subject to limits. 72
4. Copyright Cases
In addition to the patent-related cases discussed above, there is a
series of recent tying and refusal-to-deal cases concerning copyrights. 73
Each of these cases involved, with minor factual variations, the manufac-
turer of a line of computer systems and developer of software for that
system who also engaged in servicing the computer systems. To pre-
clude competition in the service market, the manufacturer denied in-
dependent service operators licenses to the manufacturer's copyrighted
software. 74 The manufacturer's copyright license with end-users for the
software also prohibited any third-party use of the software.75 In each
case, the courts upheld the manufacturers' claims that an ISO's act of
running the software licensed to the customer on the customer's own
71 Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 480 n.29.
72 Another lower court, in Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala.
1998), vacated 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999), followed the Ninth Circuit's holding in Kodak
IL The facts underlying that case form part of the basis of the FTC's recently settled suit
against Intel. See In re Intel Corp., FTC Complaint (No. 9288) (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http:ll
www.fte.gov/os/1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.htm>. Both cases involved Intel's refusal to provide
certain manufacturers of Intel-chip computers with its patented sample chips and with proprie-
tary information about those chips that were needed to build the Intel computers. Intel's be-
havior was primarily a "hardball" tactic intended to force concessions from Intergraph and two
other computer manufacturers in unrelated disputes between Intel and those companies. In
granting a preliminary injunction against Intel in Intergraph, the district court agreed with the
Ninth Circuit that a monopolist's unilateral refusal to grant intellectual property rights may
constitute exclusionary conduct. See Intergraph Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. The court
stated that patent rights "do not confer an absolute immunity from antitrust claims," and that
unlawful "exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a [pat-
ent or] copyright or to sell a patented or copyrighted work." Id. (internal citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, has just reversed the granting of the
injunction on grounds that the relationship between Intergraph and Intel is that of customer and
supplier, not competitors, and thus the antitrust laws have no application. See Intergraph Corp.
v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
73 See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); Data
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); MAI Systems Corp.
v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 551 (9" Cir. 1993); Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen.
Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992); Advanced Computer Servs. of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI
Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
74 See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1333.
75 See id.
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computer, in order to service the system, constituted copyright infringe-
ment because unauthorized "copying" occurred when the program is
loaded from the hard drive into the computer's random access memory
(RAM).76 The courts also uniformly rejected the ISOs' tying claims on
grounds that the manufacturers did not coerce the customer into using the
manufacturers' tied product (service),77 and rejected their monopoliza-
tion claims on grounds that the manufacturer may lawfully license, or not
license, its software to whomever it chooses.78
The clash between Kodak I and Kodak II on the one hand and Xerox
and the copyright cases on the other is breathtaking. The conflict dem-
onstrates that case law has not clarified the legal contours of a patent or
copyright grant, which would determine whether the, exclusionary right
of such a grant extends into other antitrust markets.
III. PATENT REFORM ACT DOES NOT ELIMINATE REFUSAL
TO DEAL AS BASIS FOR ANTITRUST LIABILITY
A few lower courts have suggested that the Patent Interference and
Misuse Reform Act of 1988 ("Patent Reform Act")79 has effectively re-
moved unilateral refusals to license a patent as a basis for any antitrust
liability.80 That is, in my view, an inaccurate interpretation of the perti-
nent provision of the Act. The Patent Reform Act, passed by Congress
in 1988, amended the patent laws by adding § 271(d)(4) to provide that
"[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief' in a patent infringement
case will be denied relief "by reason of his having.., refused to license
or use any rights to the patent."''s The language of this subsection clearly
deals with what will not constitute a defense so as to bar a patent owner's
recovery in a patent infringement action. The statutory language makes
no reference at all to antitrust claims, or to refusals to license patents in
the context of antitrust claims.
76 See id. at 1135.
77 Id. at 1137. The manufacturers simply left end users with no other choice in service
by making it impossible for anyone other than the manufacturer (or the end user) to service the
system with the accompanying software, since one obviously cannot check the system and
maintain the software without running the software in question on the computer.
78 See id See also Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d at 1187 (stating that "desire to
exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justifica-
tion .. "); Service & Training, Inc., 963 F.2d at 686 (holding that a decision not to license its
software to independent service operators is "not evidence of an illegal tying agreement" and
that "Data General may lawfully license [its copyrighted software) to whomever it chooses.").
79 Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674 (1988) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271
(d)(4)-(5) (1988).
80 See, e.g., In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F.Supp. 1131, 1135-36
(D. Kansas 1997); Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d at 118; Polysius Corp. v. Fuller Co.,
709 F.Supp. 560, 575 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 889 F.2d 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
81 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (1988).
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Historically, various misdeeds that may be committed by a patentee
are deemed patent "misuse" and may be asserted as a defense by an al-
leged infringer in a patent infringement case brought by the patentee. 82
These misdeeds, or patent misuse, include fraud or other improprieties in
applying for a patent, or tying the sale of unpatented products with the
sale of patented products. 83 Establishing patent misuse on the part of the
patentee is a complete defense to an infringement action; a defendant
invoking the misuse defense does not have to show injury or anticompe-
titive effect. 84 The misuse defense in a patent infringement case, if
proven, precludes a patentee, on an unclean hands theory, from enforcing
the patent against anyone until the misuse has been purged. 85 Any de-
fendant in a patent infringement case may assert the defense, even an
undisputed infringer who was not touched by the alleged misuse at all.86
Conduct underlying a patent misuse defense in a patent infringe-
ment case may also serve as a basis for antitrust liability. However, in
antitrust cases based on such conduct, proving the conduct that is consid-
ered patent misuse does not establish an antitrust violation.87 Ordinary
antitrust principles require the plaintiff to show, not only the fact of mis-
use, but also all other elements of an antitrust claim, as well as antitrust
injury.88 For example, to prove a Sherman Act § 2 case based on patent
misuse, the plaintiff must show not only the misuse which would consti-
tute the exclusionary conduct, but also the defendant's monopoly power.
Furthermore, if the conduct considered patent misuse was directed
against someone other than the antitrust plaintiff, the plaintiff will not
prevail. Stated differently, a misuse defense in a patent infringement
case requires only proof of the misuse by the patent holder, while an
antitrust claim based on conduct that constitutes patent misuse requires
proof of much more than that.
82 See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 342
U.S. 806 (1945) (denying enforceability of patent obtained by fraud); J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
Lex Tex, 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (denying enforceability of patent because of paten-
tee's inequitable conduct in the patent application process); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (holding that the patentee's tying the sale of its patented machine to
the buyer's purchase of unpatented salt tablets from the patentee constituted patent "misuse"
rendering the patent unenforceable).
83 See supra note 82.
84 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969) (explaining
that the challenged practice could constitute a misuse without regard to injury to the plaintiff).
85 See Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. at 493. See also B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495,
498 (1942) (stating that enforcement of a patent can be resumed once the patentee ceases the
offending misuse).
86 See Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. 488.
87 See Walker Process Equip. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78
(1965) (holding that fraud in the procurement of a patent is a misuse which renders a patent
unenforceable but would constitute a Sherman Act § 2 violation only with proof of anticompe-
titive effect in a relevant market).
88 Id
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Despite the fact that patent misuse as a defense in patent infringe-
ment cases and patent misuse as a basis for antitrust liability are not
identical legal theories requiring identical standards of proof, some
courts have inappropriately conflated their treatment of the two theories
by applying § 271(d)(4) to antitrust cases as well. Although the statutory
language of the section merely provides that unilateral refusals to license
or use a patent may not serve as the basis of a patent misuse defense in a
patent infringement case, these cases have extended its application to bar
antitrust claims based on refusals to license a patent.89 They reasoned
that the section would be rendered "virtually meaningless" otherwise, as
it would "make little sense to preclude an infringer from asserting a mis-
use defense based on a patent holder's refusal to deal" while allowing
recovery under the antitrust laws for the same conduct. 90
A close look at the language of the statute in question and its legis-
lative history shows that these cases and their rationale are incorrect.
The normal principles of statutory interpretation require examining the
language of a statute as the starting point.91 As discussed, § 271(d)(4)
provides that a patentee will not be denied relief in a patent infringement
action on the basis of a refusal to license a patent. In other words, the
section addresses what will or will not constitute an appropriate defense
in a patent infringement case. The statute does not, however, address
antitrust claims or the impact of refusals to license patents on those
claims. Furthermore, although there was little congressional discussion
concerning § 271(d)(4) itself, the overall legislative history of the Patent
Reform Act shows that Congress did consider, but specifically rejected, a
broader version of the Act which would have clearly implicated antitrust
laws.92 That Congress chose to adopt a narrower bill, which studiously
89 See, e.g., In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F.Supp. at 1135-36; Data
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) (sug-
gesting that § 271(d) "may even herald the prohibition of all antitrust claims and counterclaims
premised on a refusal to license a patent."); Polysius Corp. v. Fuller Co., 709 F.Supp. 560, 575
(E.D. Pa.) (stating that pursuant to § 271(d), "Congress has mandated ... [that] plaintiffs
cannot be guilty of either antitrust violations or patent misuse"), affd, 889 F.2d 1100 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
90 See Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F.Supp. at 1136.
91 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S.Ct. 1588, 1591
(1994) (adhering to the plain meaning of the statutory language); Central Bank v. First Inter-
state Bank, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994) (stating that following the statutory language is the
starting point in any case involving statutory interpretation); United States v. Ron Pair Enters.,
489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (noting that statutory interpretation begins "with the language of the
statute itself").
92 The Senate's version of the bill, which was ultimately rejected in favor of that of the
House, had provided that ownership of a patent or copyright shall not create a presumption of
market power under antitrust law. S. 438, § 102, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) ("In any action
in which the conduct of an owner, licensee, or other holder of an intellectual property right is
alleged to be a violation of the antitrust laws in connection with the marketing or distribution
of a product or service protected by such a right, such right shall not be presumed to define a
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avoided any reference to antitrust law, demonstrates that Congress in-
tended to confine the application of the amendments to patent cases,
without affecting antitrust rules.
Apart from statutory language and legislative history, there are other
reasons for different treatment of the patent misuse defense in infringe-
ment cases and an antitrust claim based on conduct underlying the mis-
use. As discussed, a patent misuse defense has much broader reach than
antitrust claims based on the misuse. Patent misuse as an infringement
defense serves as a complete defense even for an acknowledged infringer
who was totally unaffected by a patentee's misuse against someone
else.93 Given the breadth of this doctrine, § 271(d)(4) placed limits on
its use by providing that a patentee's refusal to license a patent may not
be considered patent misuse for patent purposes. Antitrust claims based
on conduct considered to be patent misuse, however, demand more than
proof of the misuse.94 Accordingly, such claims are harder to establish
and there is, correspondingly, less of a need to rein them in. Seen in this
light, there is no inherent inconsistency in a statutory provision that bars
an alleged infringer from asserting a misuse defense based on a paten-
tee's mere refusal to deal and yet allows an antitrust claim against a mo-
nopolist to be based on the same behavior.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: INNOVATION,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION,
AND COMPETITION
To the extent that neither statutory nor case law establishes clearly
the legal scope of an intellectual property grant, one should also look to
policy concerns in determining whether unilateral refusals to license pat-
ents should ever be considered antitrust violations. There is no definitive
test for deciding the optimal level of protection for intellectual property.
Logically, the law should not place antitrust constraints on a monopo-
list's right to refuse to license if such constraints would undermine the
intellectual property laws. Conversely, the law should not give intellec-
tual property holders carte blanche to refuse to license if that would re-
market or to establish market power, including economic power and product uniqueness or
distinctiveness, or monopoly power."). The corresponding section in the House Bill, eventu-
ally adopted as the Patent Reform Act, merely provides that, in a patent infringement case, a
patentee's tying arrangement will constitute a defense only if there is proof of the patentee's
market power in the tying market, i.e., the ownership of a patent or copyright does not create a
presumption of market power in the tying market when tying is raised as a defense to patent
infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5). See Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the
1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Anti-
trust Counterclaims, 38 DiRAic L. Rnv. 175, 192-97 (1989).
93 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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suit in frustrating the very objectives that intellectual property laws seek
to achieve. The following discusses the purposes of the intellectual prop-
erty laws, and explores the link between innovation, intellectual property
protection, and competition to determine if imposing an antitrust duty to
deal on patent holders in limited circumstances would subvert those
purposes.
A. PURPOSES OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
As already noted, until the late 1970s, it was common to stress the
conflict between antitrust and intellectual property laws. Courts viewed
patents and copyrights as creating monopolies "restrictive of a free econ-
omy,' 95 and antitrust law as restraining monopolies and preserving com-
petition. 96 To reconcile the seemingly antithetical objectives of the two
laws, the cases strictly limited the "monopoly" granted under a patent or
copyright. 97 Within the explicit statutory grant of the patent law, a patent
holder could fully exploit its patent, but any use beyond that express
grant would be unprotected and subject to antitrust scrutiny. 9s This ap-
proach to intellectual property was evident, not only in the case law, but
also in the government's antitrust enforcement policy. The Antitrust Di-
vision of the U.S. Department of Justice clearly expressed its restrictive
position on intellectual property rights in the infamous "Nine No-No's"
95 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942) (describing patents as
"privileges restrictive of a free economy[;] the rights which Congress has attached to them
must be strictly construed"). See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942)
(referring to a patent as a "limited monopoly"); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458,
463 (1938) (speaking as if a patent conferred a "monopoly"); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917) (speaking as if a patent conferred a
"monopoly").
96 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (observing that antitrust
law seeks to promote and protect a competitive marketplace for society's benefit).
97 See Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. at 250 (referring to a patent as "a limited monopoly");
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. at 277.
98 See United States v. Line Material, 333 U.S. 287, 300-04 (1948); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947); Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at
510. For a discussion of cases in this era, see Tom & Newberg, supra note I, at 170-77. The
general distrust of patents is also seen in cases that allowed licensees to challenge the validity
of their licensors' patents, broadly applied the patent misuse doctrine, or presumed the exist-
ence of market power from a patent or copyright. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 313 (1971) (holding patentee bound by finding of
invalidity but not protected by finding of validity in subsequent patent infringement suits
brought against different infringers); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 653 (1969) (finding
that a licensee may seek to invalidate its licensor's patent despite the doctrine of licensee
estoppel because of the countervailing policy of ensuring the validity of patents granted);
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962) (presuming market power from a
copyrighted movie); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 143 (1948)
(presuming market power from a copyrighted movie).
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listing various intellectual property licensing practices that the Division
considered suspect and scrutinized closely during that era.99
There has been a policy shift in recent years. Many policymakers
now perceive intellectual property protection as a necessary incentive for
innovation, 100 which is generally recognized as critical to economic
growth. 10 1 On the legislative front, Congress has passed new legislative
measures, such as the Patent Reform Act,102 strengthening the value of
patents. On the antitrust enforcement front, the Antitrust Division and
the FTC now take a more lenient approach toward conduct involving
intellectual property. 10 3 Court decisions, particularly from the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1°4 also tend to give more weight to intel-
99 In 1970 the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice articulated what became
known as the "Nine No-No's" in intellectual property licensing: 1) tying of unpatented
purchases to a patent license; 2) mandatory grantbacks; 3) post-sale restrictions on resale by
purchasers of patented goods; 4) tie-outs; veto power of licensee over the patentee's grant of
additional licenses; 5) mandatory package licensing; compulsory royalty payments that are not
reasonably related to the sales of the patented goods; 6) restrictions on sales of unpatented
goods made by a patented process; and 7) fixing a licensee's resale prices of the patented
goods. See Bruce P. Wilson, Remarks Before Michigan State Bar Antitrust Law Section and
Patent Trademark and Copyright Law Section (Sept. 21, 1972), in [1969-1983 Current Com-
ment Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,146 at 55,248 (Oct. 9, 1972). The Anti-
trust Division subsequently repudiated the Nine No-No's. See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Current
Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing Practices, Remarks Before the American Bar
Ass'n Antitrust Section (Nov. 5-6, 1981), in 50 ANTrrRUST L.J. 517 (1981).
100 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that
the "ultimate aim" of copyright law is "to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good" by giving a "fair return for an author's creative labor"). See also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (observing that the purpose of patent
and copyright laws is to promote creative activity on the part of [authors] and inventors);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,485 (1974) ("Trade secret law will encourage
invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent innovator
to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention.").
101 See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Wel-
fare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1020, 1026 (1987) ("[Tlechnological
progress is the single most important factor in the growth of real output in the United States
and the rest of the industrialized world."). See also Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Under-
pinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 247 (1994); Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System
for Both Diffusion and Exclusion, 5 J. ECON. PERsP. 43 (1991).
102 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988). The Patent Reform Act abolished the market power pre-
sumption of patents with respect to patent misuse defenses based on tying claims. Id.
§ 271(d)(5). It also expressly provided that unilateral refusals to sell or license a patent shall
not constitute patent misuse as a defense in patent cases. hi. § 271(d)(4). It should be noted,
however, that Congress considered but rejected extending the change to antitrust actions. See
discussion supra part I.
103 See IP Guidelines, supra note 4. The Guidelines express three core principles: 1) that
antitrust agencies will apply the same antitrust principles to the analysis of conduct involving
intellectual property as to any other form of property; 2) that intellectual property will not
create a presumption of market power in the antitrust context; and 3) that the agencies recog-
nize that licensing arrangements are generally procompetitive. Id. at § 2.0.
104 The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 to have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in
patent-related cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292, 1295 (1993 & West Supp. 1996).
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lectual property interests, by broadly interpreting and strongly enforcing
those claims.105
The emphasis in antitrust law, in general, has also shifted in the last
twenty years. For better or worse, the Chicago School approach to anti-
trust law has generally prevailed, 10 6 and efficiency and wealth max-
imization principles now predominantly, if not exclusively, drive
antitrust policy. Because the ultimate objectives of antitrust and intellec-
tual property law have seemingly converged, the earlier notion that the
two bodies of law are in conflict has given way to the revisionist view
that they are complementary because both serve the common purpose of
maximizing consumer welfare. 107 The two bodies of law are seen as
simply seeking to achieve the same goal through different means: by
preserving the competitive marketplace in the case of antitrust; and by
105 See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (sustaining broad patent
claims of computer-related inventions); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics
Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 23 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying liberal damage rules for patent infringe-
ment); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986) (pro-
viding broad copyright protection to utilitarian software); see also Jon F. Merz & Nicholas M.
Pace, Trends in Patent Litigation: The Apparent Influence of Strengthened Patents Attributa-
ble to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 76 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y
579 (concluding that the Federal Circuit tends to uphold broad patents, and that more than two-
thirds of patents which are litigated are found valid and infringed whereas ten years ago,
approximately two-thirds were found invalid); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, The Law
and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 8 (1991).
106 The Chicago School believes that the exclusive purpose of antitrust law should be to
promote aliocative efficiency. Thus, the Sherman Act should punish only practices that restrict
output, since only output restrictions are inefficient under price theory. The Chicago School
also assumes that all businesses are rational and that the objective of all rational businesses is
to maximize profits. Therefore, no self-interested company (who is not a monopolist) would
engage in a practice that would restrict output because that would only reduce the manufac-
turer's net revenues. According to the Chicago School, there are only two avenues toward
profit maximization: capturing more sales at the competitive price, or exercising monopoly
power to limit output and raise prices above the competitive level. The practices and strategies
of all businesses, being rational profit maximizers, so the argument goes, must be seen as steps
either toward efficiency (i.e., more sales) or toward monopoly. But because rational busi-
nesses also know that monopoly is extremely difficult to attain, the Chicago School contends
that most business conduct must be seen as strategies to enhance efficiency. For extended
expositions of the Chicago approach to antitrust, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTurRusT PARA.
Dox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1979); RicHARD A. POSNER, ANrITRUST LAW: AN Eco-
NOMIC PERSPECmvE (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 1696 (1986).
107 See BowMAN, PATENT & ANrmusT LAW, supra note 4 at I (refuting the idea that
antitrust and patent law stood in "diametric opposition" because they share "a common central
economic goal: to maximize wealth by producing what consumers want at the lowest cost").
See also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at
odds. However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at en-
couraging innovation, industry, and competition."); IP Guidelines, supra note 4, § I ("The
intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting inno-
vation and enhancing the consumer welfare.").
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protecting the rights of inventors and creators in the case of intellectual
property. 10 8
However, although the overall goals of antitrust and intellectual
property laws may be in basic harmony, the two bodies of law are not
completely complementary and tensions do exist, as the discussion in the
preceding section explores. The predominant issue is whether applying
antitrust law (i.e., the Aspen Skiing rule) to a monopolist's refusal to
license its patent, when the refusal is used to restrict competition in other
antitrust markets, would undermine the objectives of the intellectual
property regime. Close examination of the purposes of the patent and
copyright laws suggests that such limited application of antitrust princi-
ples would not subvert those purposes.
Patents and copyrights are not fundamental natural rights that must
be protected against any encroachment for their own sake. The constitu-
tional purpose behind the federal intellectual property scheme is to pro-
mote "the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'1 9 The system protects
intellectual property, not because it is sacrosanct, but because protection
promotes innovation and economic growth. Thus, the protection af-
forded by the intellectual property laws should only be broad enough to
carry out the objective of stimulating innovation. Unless limiting a pat-
ent owner's right to leverage its patent power into another antitrust mar-
ket would result in a net loss in innovation, such limits would not defeat
the purposes of the intellectual property laws.
B. IrELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, INNOVATION, AND
COMPETITION
The intellectual property laws are intended to encourage innovation
by correcting the "public good" problem of intellectual property. 110 A
public good is something that one person may take from the owner at
minimal cost and without hindering the owner's use. For example, if it
were legally permissible, an imitator could duplicate an inventor's new
process or a software developer's new program at marginal cost, making
it difficult for the innovator to recoup its innovation costs, much less
profit from its innovation. Unless an innovator can recover its costs and
profit from its investment, there would be less incentive to innovate. An
owner's legal right to exclude others under a patent or copyright effec-
tively remedies the public good problem of intellectual property by giv-
108 See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
'09 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[tlo promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
110 For a list of some of the literature discussing the public good characteristics of intel-
lectual property, see Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy,
59 Omio ST. L.J. 1633, 1639-40 nn.38-39 (1998).
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ing inventors "lead time," during which they are free from competition,
to realize the profits from their inventions. This, in turn, provides an
economic incentive for innovation, which ultimately maximizes con-
sumer welfare.
Of course, a patent or copyright "monopoly" imposes certain social
costs in that it deprives the market of competition in the patented product
for the duration of the patent. If the system overcompensates the inven-
tor, the protection may actually impede innovation by denying competi-
tors (and users) access to needed information and basic inventions that
could serve as building blocks for further progress. In short, because
competition also plays a role in fostering innovation, overprotection of a
patent holder from competition may perversely result in less, rather than
more, innovation.
Optimally, intellectual property rights should be allowed only to the
extent that societal benefits exceed the costs of protection. Unfortu-
nately, no precise formula exists for making that determination. Several
scholars have proposed different theoretical tests in an attempt to find the
proper balance. The tests include Professor Ward Bowman's "competi-
tive superiority" test, Professor William Baxter's "comparability" test,
and Professor Louis Kaplow's "ratio" test. Bowman's test essentially
allows any reward to the patent holder to the extent that the reward
"measures the patented product's competitive superiority over substi-
tutes.""' In other words, the more superior the product over the alterna-
tives, the more rights are attached. Baxter's test provides that "a patentee
is entitled to extract monopoly income by restricting utilization of his
invention ... provided that in each case he confines the restriction to his
invention as narrowly and specifically as the technology of his situation
and the practicalities of administration permit."'1 12 Professor Kaplow has
criticized Bowman's test for being overly focused on reward to the in-
ventor without sufficient consideration of the social loss associated with
monopolies, 113 and Baxter's test for being primarily concerned with min-
imizing social loss without paying adequate attention to rewarding the
inventor.' 14 Kaplow's own test looks at the ratio of gross reward (paten-
tee reward) to loss resulting from the practice-the higher the ratio, the
more desirable the practice that is contemplated by the patent holder.115
A practical problem with Kaplow's test, however, is that the information
needed to apply it reasonably well will usually not be available.
111 BowMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 4, at x.
112 William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 313 (1966).
113 See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitnst Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARv. L.
Rv. 1813, 1851-52 (1984).
114 See id. at 1853.
115 See id. at 1831.
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As these tests show, a dependable formula for determining the opti-
mal scope of protection for intellectual property, that would help resolve
the issue of antitrust limits on intellectual property fights from a policy
perspective, is hard to derive. In theory, imposing antitrust limitations
should be desirable unless they result in a net decrease in innovation.
Applying this principle in practice is difficult because there is no reliable
way to assess how much innovation is truly attributable to intellectual
property protection and how much is attributable to competition. Nor is
there a reasonably accurate method to determine whether antitrust re-
strictions on intellectual property rights actually deter and reduce innova-
tion by devaluing those rights, or whether they enhance innovation by
permitting competition outside of the field protected by the patent.
Proving conclusively what would have occurred without patents or
copyrights is, of course, virtually impossible. However, studies con-
ducted by a noted economist, Professor F.M. Scherer, suggest that the
often-presumed strong correlation between patent protection and inven-
tions is actually quite weak in most industries, and that the basic incen-
tive to invent is not the reward promised by patents but the very
existence of competition. 116 The research of several other scholars also
supports Scherer's conclusions. For example, a study of 130 industries
conducted by Professor Richard Levin and others showed that, except in
five industries, most firms surveyed did not consider patents to be very
important assets or strong incentives for innovation. 117 Professor Edwin
Mansfield's study, which surveyed 100 firms from 12 industries, re-
ported that 86% of all innovations (produced from 1981-83) would have
been developed even without patent protection, and that patent protection
was considered not essential at all for innovations in four industries.""
These works suggest that much of the impetus for innovation comes
from factors other than patent protection, such as the desire to be first on
the market with an invention and reap the benefits from its head start, or
simply the need to innovate to remain competitive. We can draw a few
116 See Special Report, 69 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1741, at 670 (Dec. 7,
1995); F.M. Scherer, Outline of FTC Testimony, (Nov. 29, 1995), in Hearings On Global And
Innovation-Based Competition Before The Federal Trade Commission, (visited site Aug. 26,
1999) <http:/www.ftc.gov/opp/globallscherer.htm> (referring to his study showing that most
companies surveyed ranked patent protection the least important factor in R&D decisions, with
competition being the most important, and that the only firms which tended to view patents as
a major incentive for R&D were in the pharmaceutical, agricultural, and chemical industries).
117 Richard C. Levin, et. al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, BROOINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC Acnvrrv, 783, 795-96 (1987).
118 Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. Sci. 173
(1986). The four industries for which patent protection was deemed not essential for innova-
tions were office equipment, motor vehicles, rubber products, and textiles. The industries for
which patent protection was perceived as being more important for innovation were the phar-
maceutical and chemical industries. Id. at 175.
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implications from the results of these surveys. If patents are not strong
incentives for innovation except in a few select industries, then circum-
scribing the scope of patent rights would not necessarily deter innova-
tion. Moreover, if the reward promised by a patent was hardly an
incentive for invention at the outset, then an antitrust rule that limits the
patent reward to some extent should not be a significant disincentive for
innovation. Finally, if competition is as much, if not more, of a stimulus
for innovation as patent protection, then less intellectual property protec-
tion might actually increase, not decrease, innovation.
A provocative book recently published comparing the Silicon Val-
ley and the Route 128 high-technology region of Massachusetts'1 9 ap-
pears to confirm the findings of these studies. Professor AnnaLee
Saxenian, the author and an urban planner, attributes much of the Silicon
Valley's success to a culture that promotes informal sharing of technical
know-how, amidst intense competition, among the many small firms that
populate the area. In contrast, the staid, larger, and more vertically inte-
grated, firms located in the Route 128 region near Boston prefer tradi-
tional self-reliance and secrecy. According to Saxenian, this difference
between the two regions with a common genesis is a major reason for
Silicon Valley's phenomenal growth and Route 128's relative stag-
nancy.' 20 Her exhaustively researched and documented observations
should cause one to rethink some of the general assumptions often made
about intellectual property protection, such as "the more protection the
better for innovation." The observations should also lead one to ask
whether the current approach to intellectual property adequately values
the role of competition in encouraging innovation.
Even if we were to discount this collection of findings and conclude
that intellectual property protection does play a significant role in gener-
ating intellectual property, it does not necessarily follow that the broader
the scope of protection, the higher the rate of innovation. 121 Construing
too liberally rights under the intellectual property laws has its dangers.
Overly broad patent grants decrease the economic opportunities for po-
tential follow-on innovators, 2 2 which may lead to less future innova-
119 ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996).
120 See id. at 2-4.
121 Strong protection is not the equivalent of a broad scope of protection, and it is possible
to have strong protection of narrow intellectual property rights. For example, vigilantly en-
forcing the law against software counterfeiting represents strong enforcement of the copyright
law, but it does not reflect broad protection because even the narrowest interpretation of a
copyright grant would necessarily include a prohibition against counterfeiting.
122 See John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth
and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J 449, 451 (1997); Richard J. Gilbert, Deputy
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Policy in High Technology Markets, Address
Before the Ass'n of American Law Schools (Jan. 7, 1994) in Rosen, supra note 1, at 671-72.
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tions. Advocates for greater rewards for the initial innovator generally
argue that broad rights are needed to allow the initial innovator to shape
the industry. 123 But there is little or no evidence that an initial innovator
will more efficiently pursue follow-on improvements than others at-
tempting to enter the peripheral areas. 124 To be sure, Joseph Schumpeter
suggested that one advantage to monopolies is that they are more condu-
cive to innovation than competitive markets. 125 If that were true, then
preserving for the inventor broad segments of the market surrounding the
innovation might make economic sense. However, Schumpeter's hy-
pothesis is now regarded as largely discredited. 126 One has to only look
at the numerous telephone-related products developed since the termina-
tion of AT&T's control over the interconnecting systems in 1984, for
example, to know that strengthening opportunities for follow-on innova-
tors will often yield more product variety and innovation than increasing
rewards for the initial inventor. 127
For a patent holder whose invention dominates or monopolizes its
relevant antitrust market, receiving monopoly profits and having the right
to control its invention in that antitrust market should be sufficient re-
ward, and incentive, for innovation. There should be no need to give the
monopolist additional incentives by permitting the leveraging of its
power in that antitrust market into another market through a refusal to
123 See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & EcoN. 265, 266 (1977).
124 See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, Market Structure and Technical Advance:
The Role of Patent Scope Decisions, in AiTrrRusr, INNovAnoN, AND COMPETwENESS 185
(Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992).
125 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPrrALISM, SocLALiSM AND DEMOCRACY 81-106 (3d ed.
1950) (hypothesizing that monopolies and oligopolies are more conducive to innovation than
competitive markets because monopoly conditions offer monopoly rents to compensate for the
risks of innovation); JOSEPH A. ScHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 61-74
(Harvard Univ. Press 1951).
126 See F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GRowTH: ScHumPETERLAN PERsPECrIvEs 246-47
(1984) (concluding from empirical studies that entrenched monopolists tend to be averse to
innovation for fear that the new products will cannibalize revenues from the monopolists'
existing products); MicHAE. E. PORTER, THE CoMwETrrvE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONs, 527-30,
577-89 (1990) (showing that monopolists in mature markets have an incentive to suppress new
technology so as to protect the monopolists' sales revenues from existing products in the mar-
kets that they dominate).
127 United States v. AT&T, 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). In the late 1970s, the De-
partment of Justice brought a Sherman Act § 2 action against AT&T which had a monopoly
over both local and long distance telephone service. The suit ended in a consent decree requir-
ing AT&T to divest itself of its local telephone companies, the Bell Operating Companies
(BOC), popularly known as the Baby Bells. Prior to the divestiture, AT&T had refused to
allow MCI, Sprint and other aspiring long-distance carriers to connect to its network intercon-
nection, and without such connection, the carriers could not provide long-distance service.
After the divestiture, the Baby Bells, which now owned the network interconnections, allowed
all carriers to have access to them, thereby opening up the long-distance telephone market to
MCI, Sprint and others.
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license its intellectual property to its competitors in the second market.
Some might argue, perhaps, that disallowing the patent holder from reap-
ing monopoly profits from complementary markets would cause eco-
nomic harm to the patent holder, "reduce" its proprietary reward, and
discourage further innovation by the patent holder. While there is no
way to completely dispel such claims, past experience shows that these
fears are unfounded or, at least, exaggerated. For example, in 1956, in a
case remarkably similar to Kodak I and 11, IBM entered into a consent
decree with the United States agreeing to sell its parts to ISOs who com-
peted with BM in the market for servicing BM equipment. 128 If dire
predictions about the effect of "reducing" incentives for innovation were
correct, IBM would not have continued to be one of the most successful
computer companies in the country for the over forty years following the
entry of the consent decree.129
Allowing a patent holder with monopoly power in the patented mar-
ket to refuse to deal with competitors in complementary markets would
eliminate competition and reduce innovation and consumer choice in the
complementary markets; and those markets would become dominated by
a single firm-the monopolist in the patent market. In the long run, such
an expansive interpretation of the rights of a patent grant would only
diminish, not enhance, innovation in the complementary markets.
Indeed, a blanket antitrust exemption for all unilateral refusals to
license intellectual property, including refusals that are used to prevent
competition in complementary markets, may discourage innovation, not
just in the unprotected complementary markets, but also in the patented
market. That is because potential entrants into the patented market
would be required to enter at two levels if there is no viable competition
in the complementary market. Not only would they have to develop a
competing product in the patented market, but they would also have to
introduce a product in the downstream, or complementary, market in or-
der to compete effectively with the dominant firm. Unless there is evi-
dence that greater incentives for dominant firms in a patented market will
induce innovations that more than offset decreases in innovation by
smaller firms in complementary markets and by potential entrants into
the protected market, limiting the dominant firms' right to refuse to li-
cense its patents would seem to be economically desirable.
128 United States v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,245
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1956).
129 Another example is Xerox, which entered into a consent decree with the FTC in 1975
agreeing to license its copier patents, for a nominal license fee, to its competitors. See In re
Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 373 (1975). Xerox has obviously continued to innovate and
compete successfully in the market since then.
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C. COMPETITION AS AN INDEPENDENT VALUE IN
COMPLEMENTARY MARKETS
In addition to enhancing innovation, competition has value in its
own right in complementary markets. Indeed, it is to preserve competi-
tion in these (tied) markets that certain tying arrangements have long
been prohibited, with no exceptions made for patents or copyrights. 130 In
fact, many of the earliest condemnations of tying were patent-related,
involving a patentee's tying the sale of unpatented, or less desirable,
items to the sale of its coveted patented goods.' 3 ' These tying practices,
at least by those with monopoly power in the tying (or protected) mar-
kets, are prohibited because they allow firms dominant in one market to
leverage their power into other markets and to foreclose competition in
those markets.
Admittedly, the validity of the monopoly leveraging theory, which
underlies the law on tying, is a subject of some debate. A group of com-
mentators, rooted in the Chicago School, have argued that the leverage
theory should not be a basis for antitrust liability because the extension
of monopoly power to complementary markets cannot possibly be harm-
ful to competition. 132 Their argument is based on the economic theory
that a monopolist can only earn a single monopoly profit, whether or not
it succeeds in dominating a complementary market. 133 If a monopolist
cannot hope to gain additional monopoly profits by excluding competi-
tion in the tied (or complementary) market, it necessarily follows that the
conduct that we call "tying" or "leveraging" must not be anticompetitive
and may, in fact, be benign or even efficient.
130 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 55 (1962) (finding unlawful the
defendant's tying of the licensing of commercially popular copyrighted films to the TV sta-
tions' acceptance of a block of unattractive films); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 415 (1947) (finding unlawful the defendant's conditioning the lease of a patented
salt machine on the lessee's purchase of salt from the defendant); Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 514 (1917) (refusing to sanction a tie-in restriction
in a patent infringement suit).
132 See ROBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR WITH IT-
SELF 372-75 (1978); RicHARD A. POsNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 171-
73 (1976); BowMAN, supra note 13, at 20, 25-27.
133 The explanation for this theory goes like this: Suppose firm A has a monopoly in the
bolt market, but not in the nut market. The user of nuts and bolts has no use for one without
the other, and therefore values the products as a "package" (e.g., $1 per bolt-nut set) but is
indifferent as to the price of each component. Suppose further that the competitive price of
nuts is $0.10 and the profit maximizing price of bolts is $0.90. As a monopolist in the bolt
market, A would charge the profit maximizing price of $0.90. If A successfully leverages its
dominance in the bolt market into the nut market so that it controls both markets, it would still
be able to charge only $1 for the nut-bolt "package." To the extent that A raises the price of
nuts, A would have to lower the price of bolts.
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This attack on the leverage theory has, in turn, been challenged as
simplistic in more recent scholarship. 34 Professor Louis Kaplow, for
example, contends that leveraging can be anticompetitive, and he points
to flaws in the critics' analysis. 135 He argues, in part, that leverage the-
ory critics used "static models," which do not show long-term effects,
and therefore conclusions drawn from the models, e.g., that monopolists
do not gain additional benefits from market extension, are suspect.136
Kaplow also challenges the critics' assumption of perfect markets when
markets, in reality, do not fit neatly within the mold of an economic
model. 137 There is clearly no consensus among economists or antitrust
commentators on this matter. Kodak I demonstrates that the Supreme
Court has not abandoned the rule prohibiting the extension of monopoly
power through leverage, 138 as it should not, because the law and econom-
ics theory claiming that monopoly leveraging is necessarily harmless is
controverted and unproven.
Unilateral refusals to deal in the Kodak context raise antitrust con-
cerns that are similar to those arising from tying arrangements. The
practice is a corollary of tying in that it can be used to achieve indirectly
the same effects that tying achieves directly in the tied market. There is
little difference in competitive outcome between the practice of denying
ISOs access to patented parts that they need to service Kodak copiers,
which effectively forces Kodak users to purchase Kodak's repair service
because there are no other alternatives (except self-service), and simply
tying the sale of service to the sale of patented parts to end-users. The
foreclosure of competition in the service market is the same whether it is
done through a unilateral refusal to deal or a tying arrangement.
In essence, maintaining competition in the complementary market is
valuable in its own right for all the usual reasons that competition is
generally favored. Competition increases buyer choice and product vari-
ety. It puts pressure on every participant in the market to cut costs, in-
crease productive efficiency, and improve the quality of its product or
service in order to stay competitive. Finally, a competitive complemen-
tary market is less likely to stagnate than a non-competitive one.
134 See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leveraging, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 515, 526-38 (1985); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exch-
sion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE, L.J. 209, 289-93 (1986).
135 See Kaplow, supra note 134, at 526-38.
136 See id. at 527-30.
137 See id. at 536-38.,
138 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. 451, 452 (1992).
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CONCLUSION
Our law is currently focused on intellectual property holders and
their rights to exclusive control of their property. Many people are wary
of allowing any antitrust "abridgement" of those rights. These fears are
seemingly based on the perception that strong enforcement of broad in-
tellectual property rights is needed to maintain American competitive-
ness in the global marketplace, and that any reduction in the reward
given the innovator would discourage innovation and harm our economy.
There is reason to be skeptical of the breadth of that premise. There is
also reason to question the wisdom of overlooking potential drawbacks
of overly expansive intellectual property protection, and of undervaluing
both the role of competition in stimulating innovation and the importance
of competition in its own right. The contemporary debate on the recon-
ciliation of antitrust and intellectual property laws seems to be framed
mostly in intellectual property terms. Yet, refusals to license intellectual
property can substantially impact competition in various markets. It is
time to shift the focus slightly to viewing this practice from antitrust
lenses and to recognize that imposing a limited antitrust duty to deal on
patent owners is unlikely to reduce innovation and may in fact enhance
it.
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